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COURT OF APPEALS 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
Mahlon Peck & Family, Inc., the plaintiff/appellant, was 
the owner of real property who enlisted the services of the 
defendants to help sell the real property. The corporation is 
referred to as the "seller." 
Lloyd R. Brooks, one of the defendants/appellees, is a 
licensed real estate agent. Stanley W. Robinson, Donna 
Robinson, and Denice A. Wilson Jepson, the other 
defendants/appellees, are the brokers or owners of Century 21 
Robinson & Wilson Realty. They are collectively referred to 
as the "agent." 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (j) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-19(3) 
because the Fourth District Court confirmed an arbitration 
award and dismissed the seller's complaint with prejudice. 
This appeal is taken, therefore, as a matter of right pursuant 
to Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR CONFIRMING THE ARBITRATION 
AWARD 
"There is no special standard governing [an appellate 
court's] review of a district court's decision to confirm, 
vacate, or modify an arbitration award." Buzas Baseball. Inc. 
v. Salt Lake Trappers. Inc.. 925 P.2d 941, 948 (Utah 1996), 
quoting First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan. 131 L. Ed. 2d 985, 
115 S. Ct. 1920, 1923 (1995). "In reviewing the order this 
court grants no deference to the district court's conclusions 
of law but reviews them for correctness." DeVore v. IHC 
Hosps.. Inc.. 884 P.2d 1246, 1251 (Utah 1994). Appellate 
review of the trial court's factual findings is under a 
clearly erroneous standard. DeVore. 884 P.2d at 1256. 
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h. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR REVIEWING ARBITRATOR'S 
MANIFEST DISREGARD OF THE LAW. 
Manifest disregard of tho law is. a judicially created 
doctrine stemming .1 1 ill i y 
arbitrator exceeding his authority. If arbitrators manifestly 
disregard t;hp law in making their decision, they can be said 
tc have exceeds • ~; «- ^ 
than mere error as to the 1 aw, the error must have been 
obvious and capable of bei ng readily and instantly perceived 
v e r a g e p e r s o n gUajj J:*:J ec| |;: ::: s s r ; e a s a]l; ;i 
The arbitrator must appreciate the existence of clearly 
governing legal principle but decide to ignore \: :i ,J 
attention ' i t: Buzas Baseball, inc. Vm salt Lake Trappers, 
Inc., 925 P.2d 941, 951 (Utah 1996); Merrill Lvnch. Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930 (2d Cir, 1986). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR REVIEWING ARB LTKATUU ,S AW'Alilll 
WHICH VIOLATES PUBLIC POLICY. 
The publi . xceptii ii in i "in J ici » 1 !_ j i tvd\ e, ,1 
ground for vacating arbitration award. See United 
Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 u,s 29, 47, mi 
i E :1 2 ' ~" 5. 1 08 S Ct 36 1 (11 98 7) . "Th h I i n pn I iry 
exception • rooted :i n th = common law doctrine ol a court# s 
power to refuse to enforce a contract that violates public 
po 1 icy Seymour v, Blue Cross/Blue Shield. 988 F ' 2 :i 
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1020# 1023 (10th Cir. 1993). The court must find a well-
defined and dominant policy against the described conduct 
after a review of the relevant laws and legal precedents. Id. 
at 1024 quoting United Paperworkers. 484 U.S. at 44. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Was it manifest error or a violation of public 
policy when the arbitrator failed to rule that the agent owed 
the seller a fiduciary duty to disclose to the seller the 
agent's prior contacts and agency relationship with the 
intended buyer regarding the sale of the plaintiff's property? 
2. Was it error for the arbitrator to find that the 
agent's conduct did not constitute a breach of his fiduciary 
duty in 1) failing to disclose to the seller his prior 
contacts with the buyer regarding the purchase of the seller's 
property, 2) failing to make reasonable efforts to ascertain 
the true value of the seller's property, and 3) failing to 
seek out other potential buyers for the property? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CASES 
The Utah Arbitration Act, Utah Code Annotated § 78-3la-
16, provides in pertinent part: "An award which is confirmed, 
modified, or corrected by the court shall be treated and 
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enforced in all respects as a judgment." (Emphasis added.) 
The Utah Arbitration Act specifically allows an appeal to 
be taken from any court order confirming an arbitration award. 
Utah Arbitration Act, Section 78-31a-19 reads: 
An appeal may be taken by any aggrieved party as 
provided by law for appeals in civil actions from 
any court order: 
(1) denying a motion to compel arbitration; 
(2) granting a motion to stay arbitration; 
(3) confirming or denying confirmation of an 
arbitration award; 
(4) modifying or correcting an award; or 
(5) vacating an award without directing rearbitration. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Utah Code Ann., Section 61-2, outlines certain violations 
for which real estate brokers or agents can be penalized. Some 
of the specific violations found in Section 61-2-11 relevant 
to this case are: 
(1) making any substantial misrepresentation; 
(4) acting for more than one party in a transaction 
without the informed consent of all parties; 
(16) breaching a fiduciary duty owed by a licensee to his 
principal in a real estate transaction; 
(17) any other conduct which constitutes dishonest 
dealing. 
Hopkins v. Wardley Corporation
 f 611 P. 2d 1204 (Utah 
1980), holds that a real estate broker, as the seller7s agent, 
owed the seller a fiduciary duty of full disclosure of facts 
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material to the principal's business. 
Phillips v. JCM Development Corp. . 666 P*2d 876 (Utah 
1983) , holds that a real estate salesman has a duty to 
exercise reasonable skill and diligence on behalf of his 
principal and the principal is justified in relying on 
information received from the salesman and broker without 
making independent investigation. Reese v. Harper. 319 P.2d 
410, 412 (Utah 1958), states: 
[b]ecause of the specialized service the real 
estate broker offers in acting as an agent for his 
client there arises a fiduciary relationship 
between them; it is incumbent upon him to apply his 
abilities and knowledge to the advantage of the man 
he serves; and to make full disclosure of all facts 
which his principal should know in transacting his 
business. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case. 
The seller appeals from an arbitrator7s decision which 
found "no cause of action" when: 
1) the real estate agent did not disclose to the seller that: 
*—the intended buyer, an acquaintance of 25 - 30 years, 
first enlisted the agent to find property for the buyer; 
*—the intended buyer and the agent looked at various 
parcels before the buyer asked the agent to approach the 
seller to see if the seller wanted to sale his property; 
2) and, after the agent signed a listing agreement with the 
seller claiming to solely represent the seller, the agent: 
*—provided no market analysis to the seller; 
*—recommended accepting an earnest money in an amount 
less than the industry standard; 
*—assisted in arranging a note for the balance of the 
purchase price with an interest rate that was less than 
the industry standard; 
*—did not place any Mfor sale11 signs on the property; 
*—did not do any advertising or prepare any flyers for 
the property; 
*—took no action to formalize the rezone from 
agricultural land to commercial land for 15 months; 
*—did not propose any counter offers on behalf of the 
seller even though the buyer needed two extensions to 
arrange financing and the sale did not close for 17 
months during a time of explosive growth in the Utah 
Valley real estate market; 
*—RELISTED THE PROPERTY FOR SALE FOR $425
 # 000 FOR THE 
BUYER ONLY 6 1/2 MONTHS AFTER THE CLOSING WHERE THE BUYER 
PURCHASED THE PROPERTY FROM THE SELLER FOR ONLY $134,880, 
A 315% INCREASE IN JUST OVER SIX MONTHS. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
The seller filed a complaint against the agent seeking 
damages for the agent's breach of his fiduciary duty, 
fraudulent non-disclosure, fraudulent misrepresentation, 
breach of his statutory obligations as a real estate agent 
under Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-11, and unjust enrichment. 
Subsequently, the parties agreed in arbitration. On or about 
January 15, 1997, the parties appeared before Stephen Nebeker 
for an arbitration hearing. On or about April 9, 1997, the 
arbitrator issued an opinion. The opinion declared that 
sellers had no cause of action against the agent, and denied 
seller's claims. The agent submitted a Motion to Confirm 
Arbitration Award and Enter Judgment of Dismissal with 
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Prejudice to Judge Howard Maetani on or about May 14, 1997. 
Because none of the statutory grounds specifically set forth 
in the Utah Arbitration Act for a trial court to modify or 
vacate the arbitration award directly apply in the present 
case, the seller did not move the trial court to modify the 
award. Judge Maetani entered the final judgment oonfirming the 
arbitrator's award on or about July 23, 1997. On or about 
August 22, 1997, the appellant filed a notice of appeal. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
1. Lloyd Brooks, a real estate agent, had an ongoing 
relationship with Carl Mellor, the intended buyer in this 
matter, having known him for "25 - 30" years. Brooks at 14. 
Additionally, the agent had represented, the intended buyer in 
a previous real estate matter. Mellor depo at 13; Brooks depo 
at 15. 
2. During September or October of 1990, the buyer 
approached the agent several times and requested the agent's 
assistance in obtaining some commercial land on which to 
relocate the buyer's business. The two men looked through the 
agent's current listings and found nothing of interest. 
Brooks depo at 16, 19; Mellor depo at 14. 
3. The buyer specifically asked the agent to approach 
the seller Peck to determine if his family corporation's 
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property was for sale, and the agent did so. The intended 
buyer testified: 
Q. So, did you ask him [the realtor] to look 
for the Peck property. 
A. Yes, I did ask him to look. And I said, 
"I'd like to see if this property is for 
sale." 
Q. Did you know who the owners were at that 
time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you approach Mr. Brooks to assist 
you in finding out the details of that 
property? 
A. Yes. 
Mellor depo at 14-16. 
4. The buyer had established an amount of $15,000 per 
acre as the maximum amount he was willing to pay for the 
prospective property. He testified: 
A. I told Lloyd that I would not pay more 
than 15,000 an acre, told him to try to 
get it for 12, and that I would not go 
over 15. And he came and said that they 
were asking for 16. And I was - - it was 
over my figure. 
Q. So your figure was 15,000 then? 
A. That was what I had programed myself to go. 
Mellor depo at 17. 
This amount was based solely on the amount the buyer 
"could afford" to pay and not on any estimate of the 
property's value. Id. at 46. 
5. The seller indicated a willingness to sell the 
property, but not for the $14,000 per acre price indicated by 
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the agent. The agent informed the seller that, dependent upon 
the annexation of the property into the City of Lehi and 
rezoning it as commercial, $16,000 per acre would be the top 
selling price for the property. The seller relied on the 
agent's expertise as a realtor in determining that $16,000 per 
acre was a fair price for his property. Brooks depo at 25-26; 
Peck depo at 32. 
6. The seller and the agent entered into a seven-month 
listing agreement on October 25, 1990. Exhibit "3." 
7. Paragraph 10 of the listing agreement, entitled 
"Agency Disclosure," which was filled out by the agent, 
indicates that the agent represented only the seller and that 
written disclosure of the agency relationship was provided to 
the seller. 
8. At all times prior to and including the closing of 
the sale from the seller to the buyer, the agent represented 
himself as the seller's exclusive agent. Complaint and 
Answer, paragraphs 1 and 25. 
9. The agent did not disclose to the seller that the 
buyer had previously asked the agent to determine whether the 
seller's land was for sale nor did he disclose that the buyer 
had already set a maximum price of $15,000 per acre. 
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10• Following verbal communications between the agent 
and the buyer, an Earnest Money Sales Agreement was entered 
into between the seller and the buyer, with the price 
established at $16,000 per acre. The Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement set a closing date of May 31, 1991. Exhibit "2". 
11. Two extensions were granted, extending the closing 
date through March 1992. Exhibits "6" and "8." The closing 
occurred in March 1992, almost a year and a half after the 
original Earnest Money Sales Agreement was signed. 
12. At the time the Earnest Money Sales Agreement was 
signed, commercial and residential real estate values were 
increasing significantly throughout Utah County. By the date 
of the second contract extension in September 1991, land 
values were increasing by 1% per month. Brooks depo at 79. 
13. Between the time the earnest money contract was 
signed and the date of the closing, the seller's property was 
annexed into the City of Lehi, rezoned as commercial, and the 
new Lehi 1-15 was constructed, increasing the value of the 
property. Complaint and Answer, 1 17; Exhibit "11." 
14. The rezone was granted by Lehi City at the seller's 
request and at the urging of the agent because commercial 
zoning, according to the agent, was the "highest value of the 
property" and the agent "thought we could get (seller) pretty 
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good money out of the property by annexing into the city and 
zoning it commercial." Brooks depo at 42-44. 
15. The seller had the right to change the conditions of 
the sale, including the price of the property, at either time 
he signed an extension on the sale, and he had no obligation 
to relist the property with the agent. Brooks depo at 39. 
However, the agent failed to explain these options to the 
seller. 
16. Despite the fact that property values had increased 
dramatically and that rezoning the property had further 
increased its value, the agent did not recall doing any 
research to determine if the property had gone up in value at 
the time of the signing of the last extension. Brooks depo at 
46. 
17. In the listing agreement entered into between the 
agent and the seller, the agent agreed to use reasonable 
efforts to sell the land. Exhibit "3." Reasonable efforts 
typically include placing a "for sale" sign on the property, 
among other things such as preparing flyers and advertising. 
Brooks depo at 13-14; Exhibits 19 and 20. These things were 
not done for the seller. (They were done later on the 
relisting.) Additionally, despite having some inquiries about 
the property, the agent did not make an attempt to procure a 
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"backup offer11 as is typically done in case the original sale 
falls through. Brooks depo at 36-37. 
18. Only six months after closing the seller's sale of 
the property to the buyer, the agent again listed the property 
for sale, this time for the buyer. The property was listed at 
$425,000, 315% more than the amount that the agent had sold 
the property for only six months earlier. Exhibit 17. 
19. The buyer received several offers for the property 
in excess of $275,000. Mellor depo at 40-45; Exhibits 21-27. 
A sale closed in November 1994 for almost $38,000 per acre. 
Mellor depo at 45. 
20. The agent received a commission for the subject 
property in both the sale for the seller and the subsequent 
sale for the buyer. Mellor depo at 37-38. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has previously recognized 
the "longstanding public policy favoring speedy and 
inexpensive methods of adjudicating disputes," Allred v. 
Educators Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 909 P. 2d 1263, 1265 (Utah 1996), it 
has also suggested that review may be necessary to assure the 
"proceeding was fair and honest and the substantial rights of 
the parties were respected." DeVore v. IHC Hosps., Inc.. 884 
P.2d 1246, 1251 (Utah 1994). As indicated in Buzas Baseball 
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v. Salt Lake Trappers, 925 P.2d 941, 951 (Utah 1996), federal 
courts have recognized "manifest disregard of the law" as a 
ground for review. "Manifest disregard of the law is a 
judicially created doctrine stemming from the exceeding 
authority statutory ground." Id., citing Wildo v. Swan, 346 
U.S. 427, 436-37. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also ruled that there is a 
public policy exception for overturning an arbitration award. 
The basis of this exception is the common law doctrine that 
the courts have the power to refuse to enforce an arbitration 
opinion that violates public policy or law. Buzas Baseball v. 
Salt Lake Trappers. 925 P.2d 941, 951 (Utah 1996). This 
exception allows the courts to maintain the integrity of 
public policy standards that have been established in Utah. 
In Utah it is a well-defined public policy that a real estate 
agent has a fiduciary duty to his principal and that he should 
honor that obligation or be held responsible for the breach of 
that duty. The arbitrator's decision in this case violates 
this public policy. To allow this arbitration decision to 
stand would set aside both statutory and case law precedents 
that work to maintain a public policy which protects innocent 
parties from real estate agents who engage in nefarious 
practices. Public policy is against allowing realtors to use 
13 
their license as a badge to defraud innocent people instead of 
the badge of competence and integrity that it should be. 
ARGUMENT 
I. AN ARBITRATOR'S DISREGARD OF THE LAW IS BASIS FOR A 
REVERSAL OF THE ARBITRATION AWARD. 
The purpose of this appeal is not to challenge the 
factual findings of the arbitrator, but to bring before the 
Court an issue of law regarding the existence and breach of a 
fiduciary duty owed by the agent to the seller. In a recent 
case, the Utah Supreme Court left open the issue of whether 
manifest disregard of the law, a judicially created doctrine, 
may provide grounds for reviewing an arbitration award. In 
footnote 8 of Buzas Baseball, 925 P.2d 941, the Court states 
that it reserves the issue of whether manifest disregard of 
the law is recognized in Utah. 
Given that the statute specifically provides that an 
award confirmed by a court should be treated in all respects 
the same as a judgment, Utah Code Ann., § 78-31a-16, awards 
that disregard established law should be subject to appellate 
review. Public policy should require that an arbitration 
award not manifestly disregard clearly established statutes 
and judicial decisions dealing with the same situation. 
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The seller recognizes that public policy supports the use 
of arbitration as a speedy and inexpensive method of settling 
disputes. That policy objective, however, can only be 
achieved if arbitrators are not allowed to manifestly 
disregard the law, as defined by this Court. Otherwise, 
participants will soon perceive that the arbitration process 
and the unreviewable decisions of a renegade arbitrator lack 
consistency, predictability and fairness. 
The perception that arbitration results in unfair 
decisions that disregard controlling law will defeat 
arbitration's purpose as an efficient just and cost-effective 
alternative to traditional litigation. Potential litigants 
will be extremely reluctant to participate in a process they 
may agree is less expensive than traditional litigation, but 
that will not result in fair decisions or protect the rights 
of all parties. Similarly, the public is likely to refuse to 
accept mandatory arbitration provisions that could otherwise 
be included in many contracts. By allowing the doctrine of 
manifest disregard of the law to be a basis of review and 
requiring arbitrators to not disregard clearly established 
lines of legal precedent, this Court can monitor and preserve 
a measure of predictability, which is necessary to establish 
confidence in the arbitration process. 
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In the present case, the arbitrator manifestly 
disregarded clear Utah law on the existence and breach of the 
fiduciary responsibility of a real estate agent towards his 
principal• This disregard of the law should allow the 
arbitration award to be appealed so that an obvious and 
readily perceivable error may be corrected and the legitimacy 
of the arbitration process may be maintained. 
As the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Buzas 
specifically reserved the issue of whether or not manifest 
disregard of the law is grounds for appeal, the seller 
addresses below the arbitrator's highly questionable 
application of Utah law to the facts of the case. The Court 
should therefore issue a ruling holding that manifest 
disregard of the law may provide grounds for appellate court 
review of arbitration awards. 
II. IT WAS ERROR FOR THE ARBITRATOR TO MANIFESTLY 
DISREGARD THE LAW. 
Along with the public policy exception the Buzas court 
also recognized that the theory of manifest disregard of the 
law may also provided a basis for vacating or modifying an 
arbitration award. Buzas Baseball, 925 P.2d at 951. The 
basis for this exception stems from the idea that an 
arbitrator cannot exceed his authority. Id. Although the 
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supreme court noted that the bounds of this doctrine have 
never been defined, it did set out certain criteria in 
applying the exception. 
The court found that more than a simple error or 
misunderstanding of the law must be shown. The error must be 
obvious in nature and readily perceivable by an average person 
qualified to be an arbitrator. Further, it must be shown that 
the arbitrator, knowing of the law, decided not to pay 
attention to it. Id. These requirements are satisfied by the 
facts of this case. 
In seller's pre-arbitration brief, the seller 
specifically presented the issues of whether it was a breach 
of his fiduciary duty for the agent to fail to disclose prior 
relations with the buyer, fail to seek out other buyers, and 
fail to ascertain the fair market value of the property. 
During the arbitration the seller carefully and thoroughly 
presented the status of the law on a realtor's fiduciary duty 
and what constituted a breach of that duty. Using both 
statutes and case law, the seller presented evidence that made 
it clear that all three of the agent's failures constituted 
breaches of a realtor's fiduciary duty. Throughout the course 
of the arbitration, the seller presented evidence establishing 
that all three of these failures occurred. While the 
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arbitrator's opinion does refer to the fair market value of 
the property, he makes absolutely no reference to findings on 
the other two issues. 
In this case the arbitrator simply chose to ignore the 
clearly defined law. The arbitrator did not say that the 
seller had made an effort to determine the fair market value. 
The arbitrator did not say that the seller had disclosed his 
relationship with the buyer or that he had tried to find other 
buyers. Utah law clearly states what constitutes a breach of 
the fiduciary duty of a realtor. That law was made known to 
the arbitrator. Facts establishing the failures of the agent 
were clearly presented. The arbitrator simply did not apply 
the law to those facts but he applied his own definition of 
what constitutes a breach in disregard of the obvious and 
readily perceivable law. 
An arbitrator cannot set his own definition of the law 
above firm precedents and clear statutory language. He cannot 
manifestly disregard the controlling authority on the issue 
upon which he is ruling. In Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Sec. 
Inc. , 847 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1988), the 10th Circuit 
articulated the same standards for the use of the manifest 
disregard theory as were set out by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Buzas, but also went on to point out that the United States 
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Supreme Court has stressed that an arbitrator does "not sit to 
dispense his own brand of [arbitrary] justice." The court 
also noted that an award is legitimate only so long as it 
draws its essence from the controlling authority. Jenkins 847 
F.2d at 634 (quoting United Steelworkers or America v. 
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (I960)). 
In the face of obvious and readily perceivable authority, 
the arbitrator decided to apply his own definition of what 
constituted a breach of a realtor's fiduciary duty. These 
actions on the part of the arbitrator constitute a manifest 
disregard of the law and as such the award should be vacated. 
III. CONFIRMATION OF THE ARBITRATION AWARD IS 
CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY 
In Buzas Baseball v. Salt Lake Trappers. 925 P.2d 941, 
951 (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme Court ruled that there was 
a public policy exception for overturning an arbitration 
award. The basis of this exception is the common law doctrine 
that the courts have the power to refuse to enforce an 
arbitration opinion that violates public policy or law. Id. 
This exception allows the courts to maintain the integrity of 
public policy standards that have been established in Utah. 
The Supreme Court has indicated that for this exception 
to apply, the court must find a well-defined and dominant 
public policy that would be negatively impacted by the 
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arbitration award. Relevant laws and legal precedents are to 
be reviewed in determining if a dominate public policy is 
involved in an arbitration award. Id. After reviewing the 
facts of this case in light of Utah law, it is apparent that 
the arbitration opinion in this case does have a negative 
impact on a clearly defined public policy. 
In Utah it is a well-defined public policy that a real 
estate agent has a fiduciary duty to his principal and that he 
should honor that obligation or be held responsible for the 
breach of the duty. This policy is clearly established in 
statutory law and in legal precedent. U.C.A. § 61-2-11 (1997); 
Hopkins v. Wardley Corp., 611 P.2d 1204 (Utah 1980); Reese v. 
Harper, 329 P.2d 410 (Utah 1958); Phillips v. JCM Development 
Corp.f 666 P.2d 876 (Utah 1983); Swallows v. Laney, 691 P.2d 
874, (N.M. 1984); Jones v. Maestas, 696 P.2d 920 (Idaho App. 
1985); Adams v. Cheney. 661 P.2d 434 (Mont. 1983). 
The Utah Code has recognized the fact that a real estate 
agent has a fiduciary duty and establishes harsh penalties for 
the breach of that duty. Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-11(16) allows 
the Division of Real Estate to impose penalties on a real 
estate broker who is guilty of "breaching a fiduciary duty 
owed by a licensee to his principal in real estate 
transactions." The penalties that can result from a breach 
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of the duty may include suspension or revocation of the 
broker's license or probation. Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-11. 
There are also criminal penalties since a breach of the 
fiduciary duty as a violation of this section of the code is 
a Class A misdemeanor. Furthermore, individuals injured by a 
breach of the fiduciary duty may recover triple damages. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-17(4). The serious treatment of a real 
estate agent's fiduciary duty in the Utah Code establishes 
Utah's strong public policy that a real estate agent should be 
considered a fiduciary of his principal and that he honor that 
duty. 
The case law in Utah also clearly establishes a strong 
public policy in favor of regulating a real estate agent's 
relationship with his principal. Reese v. Harper, 329 P.2d 
410 (Utah 1950), established the clear precedent that a 
fiduciary relationship exists between a realtor and his 
clients. Reese discussed that fiduciary duty and established 
that a realtor must use his skill exclusively to advance the 
interest of his principal, for "it is incumbent upon [the 
agent] to apply his abilities and knowledge to the advantage 
of the man he serves; and to make full disclosure of all facts 
which his principal should know in transacting the business." 
Id. at 412. 
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The Reese court quoted with approval a Virginia case that 
stated it is the agent's "duty to inform his principal of all 
facts which might influence his principal in accepting or 
rejecting the offer." Id. at 413 (quoting Duncan v. Barbour, 
49 S.E.2d 260, 265). 
The unique fiduciary duty owed by a real estate agent to 
his client was stressed by the court in .Reese because an agent 
licensed by the state is permitted "to hold himself out to the 
public as qualified by training and experience to render a 
specialized service in the field of real estate transactions." 
Id. at 412. The court went on to state: 
There rests upon him the responsibility of honestly 
and fairly representing the interests of those who 
engage his services . . . [and] persons who entrust 
their business to such agents are entitled to 
repose some degree of confidence that they will be 
loyal to such trust and that they will, with 
reasonable diligence and in good faith, represent 
the interests of their clients. Unless the law 
demands this standard, instead of being the badge 
of competence and integrity it is supposed to be, 
the license would serve only as a foil to lure the 
unsuspecting public in to be duped by people more 
skilled and experienced in such affairs than are 
they. 
Both Utah statutes and case law recognize the existence and 
significance of a realtor's fiduciary duty to his client. The 
public policy behind imposing a fiduciary duty and applying 
penalties for the breach of that duty on those realtors 
licensed by the state assure that the integrity of the state 
license is maintained and that the citizens of Utah are 
protected. A major public policy question in this case is 
whether a realtor has been allowed to hold out his Utah 
license as a foil and whether a Utah citizen looking to sell 
his property so he could retire has been protected as the 
state intended. 
While it is clear that such a duty is breached when a 
realtor withholds or fails to fully disclose information 
pertinent to the sale, this is not the only conduct which can 
result in a breach of fiduciary duty. In Smith v. Carroll 
Realty Co., 335 P.2d 67 (Utah 1959), the Utah Supreme Court 
specifically outlined another of a realtor's duties to his 
principal. The court in Smith found that a realtor has a duty 
to "determine the reasonable value of the property." Id. The 
court made it clear that the realtor's failure to do so would 
not be justified even if he had merely neglected to obtain the 
reasonable market value of the property. Id. at 69. 
Mr. Brooks, the agent in the case at hand, as a realtor, had 
a duty to the seller to take significant steps to ascertain 
the reasonable fair market value of the property in question. 
According to the Utah Supreme Court in Smith, the seller in 
the case at hand was justified in relying on the price 
provided by the agent, a realtor "more skilled and experienced 
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in such affairs" than he and his wife. In Reich v. 
Christopulous, 256 P.2d 238 (Utah 1953) the Utah Supreme Court 
stated the real estate agent "had a duty to represent (the 
seller's) interest in good faith, to discharge it with 
reasonable skill and diligence and to disclose to them all 
pertinent facts which would have materially affected their 
interest." Reich, see also Smith, 335 P.2d at 68. 
The arbitration award in this case would work against 
these public policies. The record shows that the agent had a 
fiduciary duty to the seller and that he failed to disclose 
his prior contact with the buyer. The record also shows that 
the agent failed to make a reasonable effort to seek out other 
potential buyers, and that he failed to take any steps to 
determine the true fair market value of the property. All of 
these actions breach the agents' fiduciary duty to the seller. 
To allow this arbitration opinion to stand would set aside 
both statutory law and case law precedents that work to 
maintain a well-defined public policy in Utah. 
IV. IT WAS ERROR FOR THE ARBITRATOR TO FIND THAT THE 
AGENT DID NOT OWE SELLER GENERAL FIDUCIARY DUTIES. 
In addition to the statutes governing breach of fiduciary 
duty by a realtor there are several Utah cases which also 
address the issue. Reese discusses the fiduciary duty between 
a broker and his principal. A realtor must use his skill 
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exclusively to advance the interests of his principal, for "it 
is incumbent upon [the agent] to apply his abilities and 
knowledge to the advantage of the man he serves; and to make 
full disclosure of all facts which his principal should know 
in transacting the business." Reese at 412. 
The agent clearly committed a breach of his fiduciary 
duty by failing to determine a reasonable value for the 
seller's property. The failure to do so not only netted the 
agent two commissions on the same property within a matter of 
months, but it also netted his long-time client and friend, 
the buyer, a whopping profit. The agent also failed to 
disclose to the seller that the seller was not obligated to go 
through with the sale and had the option to renegotiate each 
time the earnest money sales agreement expired and was 
extended. The agent failed to inform the seller that he could 
easily get more than $16,000 per acre for his land, which the 
agent himself must have believed, since he testified real 
property was appreciating at 1% per month. The agent's breach 
is also evidenced by his listing the very same property for 
more than three times the selling price only six months after 
the sale to the buyer was finalized. 
The seller's reliance on the agent's misrepresentations 
concerning facts material to the transaction caused the seller 
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to sell his land at a price that was far less than the true 
fair market value. 
V. IT WAS ERROR FOR THE ARBITRATOR TO FIND THAT THE 
AGENT'S CONDUCT DID NOT CONSTITUTE A BREACH OF HIS 
FIDUCIARY DUTY TO THE SELLER. 
At the time the original Earnest Money Sales Agreement 
was signed, commercial and residential real estate values were 
increasing throughout Utah County. Northern Utah County, 
where the seller's land is located, experienced the greatest 
increase in value due to its proximity to Salt Lake Valley. 
Between the 1990 listing and when the first contract extension 
was signed in May 1991, land values in Utah County had 
increased 11.53%. Exhibit 30. By September 1991, when the 
second contract extension was signed, land values had 
increased even more. In addition to this general increase in 
land values, during this same period seller, had accomplished 
the annexation of the land into the City of Lehi, the property 
was rezoned as commercial, and the new Lehi freeway 
interchange was being constructed. These factors had the 
effect of further increasing the value of the land. 
During the year and a half that it took agent to finally 
complete the sale of the property to the buyer, the agent 
never once informed the seller that real estate values in the 
area had drastically increased. Neither had the agent 
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disclosed to the seller that his land had gone up in value 
because it had been annexed into the City of Lehi, rezoned as 
commercial, and the proximity of the property to the new 1-15 
freeway interchange. The agent had an affirmative duty to 
make those disclosures to the seller, yet he failed to do so. 
His silence breached his duty to his seller. The agent, as a 
realtor by profession, obviously was aware of the value of 
real estate and the upward trend of the marketplace for land 
in northern Utah County. He understood that the value of land 
in the area was going up for a number of reasons, including 
the construction of the new freeway interchange nearby, the 
rezoning of the property, and the general increase in property 
value in the area. If, for some reason, the agent was unaware 
of the true value of the land, or how the rezoning and freeway 
interchange would affect the value of the land, he had a duty 
to make all reasonable efforts to ascertain the increasing 
reasonable value of the land. The agent, however, could not 
recall doing any research that would have helped determine 
whether the seller's property had increased in value during 
the period of time following the signing of the original 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement. Brooks depo at 46. According 
to the Utah Supreme Court in Smith, the agent had a duty to 
determine the increasing value of the seller's property and to 
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disclose this information to seller, his client. The agent 
failed to do so and thereby breached his fiduciary duty to the 
seller. 
The agent further breached his fiduciary duty to the 
seller by failing to disclose a conflict of interest which 
existed by reason of (a) the agent's real estate and business 
dealings with the buyer immediately prior to this transaction; 
and (b) that the buyer had previously contacted the agent, 
requesting that agent look for land suitable for the buyer's 
needs at a predetermined price, specifically requesting that 
the agent inquire about the seller's property, prior to the 
agent's contacting the seller and listing the seller's 
property. 
The buyer approached the agent and told the agent he was 
looking for property on which to locate his business. Brooks 
depo at 15. The two men searched a listing of properties the 
agent had for sale, but found nothing of interest to the 
buyer. Id. at 16. The buyer then asked the agent to 
determine whether several pieces of land, including the 
seller's property, were for sale. Mellor depo at 14-15. The 
buyer set the price he was willing to pay for the property. 
Only after the buyer requested that the agent inquire about 
the seller's property did the agent approach the seller about 
28 
selling his property. As an agent for the buyer, the agent 
should have disclosed his conflict of interest to the seller, 
yet he not only failed to do so, he affirmatively 
misrepresented his agency by his own hand on paragraph 10 of 
the Earnest Money Sales Agreement. Exhibit M3. M This failure 
constituted yet another breach of the agent's fiduciary duty 
to the seller. 
Furthermore, the agent breached his fiduciary duty to the 
seller by failing to inform the seller that he was under no 
obligation to go through with the sale under the terms of the 
original Earnest Money Sales Agreement once that agreement had 
expired. In his deposition, agent acknowledged that seller 
was under no such obligation. Brooks depo at 39. Upon the 
expiration of the original Earnest Money Sales Agreement, the 
seller could have renegotiated the price of the land, declined 
to sell at all, or changed realtors had he known of his 
agent's conflict. The agent failed to disclose these options 
to the seller and the seller agreed to extensions on the sale 
without seeking any other changes in terms. The seller signed 
the extensions without being advised that it would be in his 
best interest to let the contracts expire and place the land 
on the market at a price more in line with the true market 
value. 
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The seller rightfully relied on his agent to have the 
knowledge and expertise to determine the fair market value of 
the land, or to conduct a proper inquiry to determine the fair 
market value of seller7s land. The seller relied on his agent 
to aggressively represent the interests of the seller, not to 
mislead him in order to help the subsequent buyer get a 
bargain price on the land. The seller was led to believe by 
the statements and actions of the agent that the agent was 
working for him and him alone. Utah law holds these 
assumptions and beliefs on the part of the seller to be 
reasonable and valid by reason of the fiduciary duty owed by 
the agent to the seller. The agent's conduct clearly 
constituted a breach of that fiduciary duty. 
The agent's breach of fiduciary duty cost the seller 
$74,991.06, the difference between the price the seller 
received for his land and the appraisal price on the date of 
the last extension. In addition, the seller is entitled to 
interest on this amount from the date of the sale of the 
property to the buyer. Furthermore, under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-2-17(4) the seller was entitled to three times the 
commission received by the agent from the two sales as treble 
damages because the agent profited from the breach of his 
fiduciary duty and his duty of loyalty to the seller. T h e 
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arbitrator failed to consider the impact that Brooks' dual 
agency had on the sales price of the property. The arbitrator 
did not adequately address whether the sales price was 
reasonable in light of the circumstances. Whether or not the 
price defendants set for the Peck property was reasonable 
depends upon whether the highest and best use of the property 
is for commercial or residential use. The evidence in the 
record indicates that all parties acknowledged that the 
property was suited for commercial use and that it was "worth 
much more" as commercial. Brooks depo at 25, 42, 43. 
1. The property was identified by Brooks and Mellor as a 
desirable location for Mellor's commercial use. Mellor depo 
at 16; Brooks depo at 17. 
2. Don Gurney, an appraiser with over twenty years 
experience and ten years of specialization in the appraisal of 
commercial property in Utah County, concluded that the highest 
and best use of this property is commercial. Guerney 
appraisal at 9. 
3. Mellor, the buyer, determined that the property was 
well suited for his commercial business. He bought the land 
for commercial use and turned around and sold it as commercial 
property. 
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4. Robert Young, a potential purchaser was willing to 
pay $275,000.00 for the property as commercial land. Earnest 
Money Agreement, Seller's Arbitration Exhibit 21; Mellor depo 
at 41. 
5. The subsequent purchasers of the property, Allred and 
Robbins, also believed the Peck land to be desirable as 
commercial property and paid $320,000 for it. Mellor depo at 
45. 
The only person who believes that this property, situated 
along the State Street corridor and within sight and hearing 
of 1-15, was best suited for residential use is Kent 
Carpenter. The appraisal by Carpenter takes the astounding 
position Peck's property is best suited for residential use 
rather than commercial use. Carpenter appraisal at 27. 
Carpenter takes that position even though he notes that 
approval for the commercial zoning and annexation by Lehi was 
"virtually assured" and that the annexation and rezone could 
have been obtained at "any time." Carpenter appraisal at 23, 
77. 
Carpenter's conclusion that the property is best suited 
for residential use is not surprising considering his very 
limited experience in conducting commercial land appraisals. 
Carpenter stated that this appraisal was only his fifth 
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commercial land appraisal in Utah, This was his first ever in 
Utah County. His prior experience was in California where he 
reviewed appraisals done by others. In contrast to 
Mr. Gurney/s twenty years of continuous work as an appraiser, 
Mr. Carpenter is no longer working as an appraiser. Carpenter 
had not lived in Utah since 1981. He had, in fact, only moved 
back to Utah in 1995, the same year he was hired by the 
defendant to conduct this appraisal. The Utah County market 
which Carpenter was acquainted with in 1981 was very different 
then the same market in 1992. Carpenter was not present in 
Utah or Utah County during the time in question to feel the 
energy that was stimulating the real estate market to record 
levels. 
CONCLUSION 
The arbitration award is subject to review by the Utah 
Supreme Court under the judicially created doctrine of 
manifest disregard of the law doctrine. The agent did owe a 
fiduciary duty to the seller to disclose his prior 
relationship with the buyer regarding the sale of the seller's 
property, to make reasonable efforts to seek out other 
potential buyers, and to make reasonable efforts to ascertain 
the true fair market value of the property. The facts show 
that the agent's conduct in affirmatively concealing his prior 
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contacts with The buyer regarding the possible purchase of the 
seller's property, failing to seek out other potential buyers 
for the property, and failing to make reasonable efforts to 
ascertain the true value of the seller's property constituted 
a breach of his fiduciary duty to seller• 
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